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COMMERCIAL SPACE ACTIVITIES: 
AN INVENTORY OF LIABILITY - AN INVENTORY OF 
PROBLEMS 
Frans G. von der Dunk* 
Abstract 
Wherever commercial activities are undertaken, the 
question of liability for harmful effects of those 
activities to others is one of the first things to come 
to a lawyer's mind. With space activities of course, as 
long as endowed with commercial character, it is no 
different. Nevertheless, the special character of space 
activities as a category and space as an area, reflected 
in the corpus juris spatialis which has developed over 
the past decades as a lex specialis to the lex generalis 
of general public international law, provides this 
question of liability with a number of special features 
when regarded in this context. 
Where time and again confusion arises as to what 
"liability" means in theory and, as a consequence, 
entails in practice, before focussing on the issue of 
liability for commercial space activities it seems 
adamant to provide some clarity on these issues to 
allow sensible dialogues and discussions. The present 
paper therefore purports to survey a number of general 
aspects which arise in respect of liability as a notion 
common to more or less all municipal legal systems 
and to international law as a whole, and then to 
analyze briefly how these aspects specifically relate to 
the issue of commercial space activities. Hence, an 
inventory is made of the most important aspects of 
the notion of liability in theory, which should be 
helpful in clarifying the specific juridical 
consequences of liability for commercial space 
activities - and at least focusses discussions. Among 
these aspects, some of the most important relate to 
the intricate relationship between public international 
and private, civil liability, and the relevance of the 
notion of the "appropriate state" for the field of 
liability. A short comparison with the doctrine of 
state responsibility, as it has developed in the state-
to-state relationship defined by international law and 
transplanted into space law, is unavoidable on some 
of the subissues concerned. 
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Theoretically speaking, eight different aspects of 
"liability" are submitted to be of paramount 
importance for any analysis of liability as it operates 
vis-a-vis commercial activities. When surveying these 
eight paramount aspects of any liability regime, at 
the same time by relating them to the specifics both 
of space activities and of the space law-liability 
regime, as illustrated by 'legal facts' of both 
international and national brand, the problems which 
remain with respect to liability for commercial space 
activities are taken stock of, and the fundamental 
character of the relationships between public 
international and private liability, respectively 
international liability and state responsibility are 
highlighted. It is submitted, that any analysis of the 
issue of commercial activities and the related liability-
questions should at least take account of the inventory 
of problems thus provided. 
1. Introduction 
Of course, liability questions are of fundamental 
importance for those undertaking commercial 
activities of whatever kind. Otherwise succesful 
business undertakings could be totally destroyed 
merely by the fact that liability has not been duly 
taken into account and cared for. The basic question 
therefore is, how does liability operate specifically 
for commercial'space activities? What risks, what 
opportunities does it provide? What specific aspects 
of liability are worth scrutinizing by a commercial 
enterprise before undertaking space activities? 
Liability from the point of view of entities 
undertaking commercial space activities may seem 
a many-headed dragon. Liability in the legal sense 
relevant for those entities is probably best defined 
as "an obligation one is in law or justice to 
perform", or more to the point, the "condition of 
being responsible for a possible or actual loss, 
penalty, evil, expense, or burden", or even a "duty 
to pay money or perform some other service".l 
For a clear insight into the relevance of the topic of 
liability for commercial space activities, starting 
from such definitions it will be necessary to 
develop some further theoretical outlines of the 
principle. In that way, a frame of reference will 
materialize for any discussion on practical issues 
and problems. It is this frame of reference, together 
with a few examples and some general concluding 
remarks, which the present paper sets out to 
present 
Liability as a notion, developed and still rooted 
very much in municipal legal systems, invites 
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many questions when it comes to activities which 
take place in the special international area of outer 
space. This holds true, despite the prominent 
conclusion of liability as a central mechanism in 
the Outer Space Treaty2, as the basis for all 
international space law, and the elaboration of that 
mechanism·by means of the Liability Convention3. 
For example, the question arises what the exact 
relation under international space law is with the 
twin notion of responsibility, which is also given a 
prominent place in the Outer Space Treaty4, but is 
not elaborated by means of an additional 
international legal instrument. How does liability 
for space activities principally operate on the 
national level, in view of the international character 
of space law - and the international status of outer 
space? Where does the fact that most private space 
activities are commercial ones, while commercial 
ones are often automatically equated to private 
ones, come into this picture? 
While dealing with those fundamental questions, a 
summary analysis will be made of the eight 
different theoretical aspects of "liability" which are 
perceived by this author to be of importance, as 
they appear both on liability in general and on 
space law liability in particular. Moving from the 
theoretical to the practical, they will provide some 
sort of preliminary theoretical checklist, defining 
the parameters for the problems of liability for 
commercial space activities. The inventory of 
problems thus provided, it is submitted, will allow 
for a clearer focus when efforts are undertaken to 
solve some of the most pressing issues relating to 
liability vis-a.-vis private and commercial space 
activities.S 
As a starting point, the first aspect is that of 
arriving at a definition of liability, focussing on 
damage as the paramount trigger. A second and 
closely related question pertains to the consequences 
in abstracto once liability has arisen, especially that 
of compensation. A third aspect relates to the 
question of the entity liable under a regime at issue, 
and the relationship with the causation of the 
damage. A fourth aspect relates mirrorwise to the 
question of the victimized entity, and its potential 
to claim compensation for the damage concerned. A 
fifth question then is the mechanism in force to 
deal with liability claims between claiming and 
liable entities. 
Sixthly, narrowing down on how liability is 
working - be it still in abstracto - the relationship 
between liable and claimant entities is scrutinized, 
with a view for example to the rather general 
practice of waivers. This relates to the inter party-
versus-third party liability dichotomy, and the 
comparable distinction between contractual and tort 
liability. Seventhly, the character of a particular 
liability regime as to absolute, strict, risk or fault 
liability, and the question of the burden of proof, is 
an important element of any analysis. 
Finally, as an eighth point the issue of 
compensation will be tackled once more, this time 
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mainly on its practical component: is 
compensation theoretically unlimited, or are there 
caps on liabilities, and if so, how are they 
construed? This is the culminating point of 
analysis from the point of view of any 
commercially oriented entity, since it relates most 
directly to the question of whether a specific 
commercial undertaking will be profitable or not. 
2. A Further Definition of "Liability" 
The first step in this regard is the elaboration of the 
definition of "liability" by focussing on how the 
principle operates. Liability, as can be glanced 
already from the few definitions provided, is a form 
of accountability of legal persons towards other 
legal persons for specific activities and their 
consequences. The many different national legal 
systems in which the principle has been elaborated 
moreover all have in common that the operation of 
the principle is triggered by the causation of 
damage. If damage occurs, liability can be invoked 
at least in principle; if damage is absent, no issues 
of liability could enter discussions. This is also 
true for space law.6 
Damage is defined for the purpose of space law-
liability rather strictly to the extent that it means 
"loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of 
health; or loss of or damage to property of States or 
persons, natural or juridical, or property of 
international intergovernmental organizations"7. 
Hence, it does not for example include indirect 
economic damage, in contrast for instance to the 
legal framework originally established for space 
station "Freedom "8, or immaterial damage other 
than impairment of health as they might be 
acknowledged under public international law9 or 
national legal systems. 
Another important factor to keep in mind when 
discussing liability under the pertinent rules of 
space law, is that the principle can only be invoked 
as long as the damage in question has been caused 
by a space object. I 0 Hence, damage caused for 
example to a communications satellite directly 
from the earth, without an intermediate role for 
another space object, falls outside the scope of the 
space law-liability regime - and most probably 
outside of any other liability-regime as well. 
Although so far this remains theory, the increasing 
proliferation of communication satellites and 
ground stations, not to speak of the increasing 
amount of commercial disputes related to 
communications satellites' orbital positions and 
frequencies, make for an exponentially increasing 
possibility that such occurrences might happen in 
the not too distant future. I 1 
The role of damage as the sale trigger of liability is 
not self-evident however. The International Law 
Commission for example has tried to confine the 
operation of the principle of liability in public 
international law to those cases of damage only 
where no internationally wrongful act, that is no 
violation of an international obligation, is at 
issue. 12 The reason for adding a second 
indispensable trigger of liability lies in the concept 
of state responsibility which the ILC is dealing 
with more or less simultaneously; and this is the 
source of much confusion also on liability.13 
Responsibility, as another fundamental mechanism 
of accountability operative under public 
international law, is triggered precisely by the 
occurrence of an internationally wrongful act, 
including cases where these acts cause or involve 
damage 14. Hence, responsibility threatens to' 
overlap in its operation, with respect to cases of 
damage, with the operation of liability. Since this 
overlap also appears in the Outer Space Treaty and 
the Liability Convention, where damage is given 
an unequivocal role as the sole trigger of liability 
and damage as an important element of an 
internationally wrongful act is not excluded under 
responsibility, it can not be ignored however. 
State responsibility in outer space law, similarly to 
general public international law, attaches to states 
as soon as certain activities are not "carried out in 
conformity with the provisions set forth in the 
present Treaty,,15. Since the same treaty includes 
an obligation for states to "carryon activities in 
( ... ) outer space ( ... ) in accordance with 
. international law, including the Charter of the 
United Nations" 16, one can safely assume that 
responsibility in space law operates no different in 
principle from state responsibility in general public 
international law . 
The consequences of this general structure of 
liability (and likewise those of responsibility) under 
space law specifically for commercial activities will 
only become apparent after going into more detail 
as to how liability works, once relevant damage has 
been ascertained. In any case, undertaking efforts for 
the prevention of damage by oJlle's activities 
obviously at this stage would be a wise thing to 
do, since damage might directly trigger liability, 
and indirectly responsibility in some cases. 
3. The Consequences in Law of Liability 
This leads us to the second issue regarding liability. 
The principal consequence of liability being 
incurred for damage is a duty for the relevant entity 
to compensate such damage. The overlap with 
responsibility becomes effective here, since in the 
case of international responsibility arising under 
space law as well as under general international 
law, the responsible state has to provide reparation 
for the international wrongful act in question -
which in principle amounts to a duty to 
compensate damage if damage has occurred as a 
consequence or an element of the international 
wrongful act in question.17 
While nothing has been elaborated further on these 
potential consequences of responsibility for certain 
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space actIVItieS, in terms of the duty to pay 
compensation for damage which occurred - would 
restitutio in integrum be obligatory under all 
circumstances? could punitive damages be awarded? 
- with respect to the the consequences of liability 
the Liability Convention is quite clear: material 
compensation has to be provided.18 
The relevance of this conclusion vis-a-vis 
commercial space activities is obvious. Although 
for non-commercial space activities the same 
consequences attach to damage and the resulting 
liability, it is especially for commercial activities, 
undertaken as they are for profit motives, that the 
chances of an accident occuring and the average 
damage resulting from such accidents should be 
calculated as carefully as possible, in order to 
discern whether the actiyity in question 
commercially speaking is indeed worth undertaking. 
Whether the entity undertaking activities includes 
liability in its calculations by earmarking some of 
its own assets for such occasions, or by insuring 
itself with an insurance company against a certain 
premium, does not make a fundamental difference 
in this respect. If it is taking no chances, it will 
also take care of potential obligations to pay 
compensation as a consequence of responsiblity 
arising. 
4. The Causation of the Damage and the Liable 
Entity 
At the same time, the above brings us tei the third 
aspect of liability, the entity to be identified as the 
one who has to compensate for the damage in 
question. Here, a peculiar trait of especially space 
law-liability becomes apparent. In municipal legal 
systems where liability was developed, it attaches 
to persons, whether natural or juridical, who could 
be held accountable for the occurrence of the 
damage because they, in actual fact, caused that 
damage. This is what one might call civil liability , 
or private liability if it is kept in mind that public 
entities such as states could also be held liable as 
long as they had in actual fact caused the damage in 
question. In any case, these systems of civil 
liability operated within a specific national state, 
jurisdiction and legal order. 
When liability as a mechanism is transferred to the 
international, inter-state level, it can take two 
fundamentally distinct forms. The first is a simple 
elevation of civil or private liability to the 
international level, or more exactly, adding 
transboundary aspects to the liability of (private) 
legal persons. The entity actually causing the 
damage is still held liable in those cases of 
transboundary damage. This happened for instance 
in air law, where both with respect to liability for 
damage to persons and goods on board aircraft 19 
and with respect to liability for damage occurring 
on the ground20 (private) carriers or operators are 
held liable and will have to compensate the 
respective damage. 
These treaties essentially are treaties of private 
international law, obliging the states parties, where 
necessary, to harmonize their national legislation 
with respect to cases involving liability 
respectively to establish such legislation in line 
with the requirements provided for by the treaties. 
Only in addition, public inter-state mechanisms 
were created by those treaties to help that process of 
harmonization. 
Under international space law on the contrary 
international liability took on the second form: an 
elevation of the system of liability as a whole to 
the international level, with the subjects of 
international law - the states - themselves as the 
liable entities.21 This, importantly enough, even if 
the damage concerned was the consequence of a 
partially or completely private launch activity. 
The Liability Convention provides four criteria for 
a state to become a liable entity in respect of a 
certain case of damage, through the notion of 
"launching state": a state which launches, a state 
which procures the launch of, a state whose facility 
is used for the launch of, as well as the state whose 
te~itory is used for the launch of a specific space 
object are to be held liable in case that space object 
causes damage.22 
Under the first of those criteria, either a state or a 
number of states (co-)launched the space object in 
question - and hence are liable in case of damage -
or a private entity or a number of private entities 
launched it - and hence no entity would be liable 
under this heading. Mutatis mutandis, the same 
applies to the procurement of the launch and the 
availability of a launch facility for the launch. 
Only on the fourth criterion, focussing on the 
territory of the launch, by definition states could 
not be replaced by private entities. Thereby, 
through this criterion, there would always be a state 
which would be held liable for an (otherwise) 
totally private launch - the so far theoretical cases 
o! launches from Antarctica, the high seas, 
arrspaces or outer space left aside. 
Obviously, this provision has led those few states 
aw~e of the risks of being presented with liability 
claIms for damage which was actually privately 
caused, to provide some form of national legal 
regulation of private launches on their territories in 
which ~artial) de~ogation of international liability 
to the pnvate parttes concerned, in order to bridge 
the gap between the entity legally liable and the 
entity actually guilty, played the predominant role. 
As we will see23 , for bridging that gap several 
modes have been used which have a considerable 
impact on the commercial market especially for 
launching activities. 
Four states have taken care to bridge that gap at all: 
three by means of national legislation and a fourth 
by means of a special legal construction. The 
United States has done so, as soon as truly private 
launch activities were made possible, by means of 
the Commercial Space Launch Act of 198424 , 
which was amended in 198825, Sweden by means 
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of its Act on Space Activities of 198226, and the 
United Kingdom by means of its Outer Space Act 
of 198627. France has taken the somewhat different 
road, partially due to the special relationship of 
Arianespace not only with France but also with the 
European Space Agency, of a Declaration of 
1980.28 
As to responsibility under space law, Article VI of 
the Outer Space Treaty also establishes a 
dichotomy between the causator of damage, as part 
of an internationally wrongful act, and the 
accountable entity, in case of private entities' 
activities. A state is also responsible for such 
private activities, as long as they are to be 
considered national activities of that state. Here 
arises the much discussed question of which state is 
the "appropriate state", as the state whose "national 
activities" are at issue.29 
On the other hand, private entities would only 
become involved on this issue to the extent their 
states have considered themselves "appropriate 
states" and consequently have taken care to include 
the consequences of international responsibility in 
their national regulation. 
Another important aspect of the system of public 
international liability in space law from the 
commercial point of view concerned the focus of 
liability on launching. A state would be liable 
because it would be considered a launching state of 
the space object causing the damage - even if the 
damage was not caused by or during the launch 
activities, but for instance by operational activities 
in respect of a satellite that had been launched years 
before. Especially in view of the recent but 
growing practices of selling or leasing satellites in 
orbit30, the result is that by contract the sellers and 
lessors had to take care, and indeed took care, that 
their potential liability (whether directly under 
international space law, if they were states, or 
indirectly through national legislation, if they were 
not) would be derogated to the buyers and lessees. 
5. The Victimized Entity and the Right of 
Claiming 
Mirrorwise to the third question, the fourth one 
becomes to what extent under international space 
law private entities or private persons are allowed 
to claim if they have been the victims of damage, 
or whether here again a truly public system has 
been chosen, potentially differentiating between 
actual victim and entity allowed to claim. 
While the Liability Convention leaves open the 
possibility for private legal persons to claim in 
certain national courts under national laws31 , it 
does not add anything in this context itself - unlike 
for instance the air law conventions on such 
lopics32, which at least enlarge the possibilities for 
claiming by private entities and obliges states 
parties to open up these venues if they did not 
already exist. 
The Liability Convention itself establishes only 
the possibility for states to claim even if the 
damage was partially or completely suffered by 
private entities.33 Private entities are therefore 
dependent upon primarily the state whose 
nationality they have, if they feel it appropriate or 
beneficial to have their claims asserted on the 
international level as it is dealt with by the 
Liability Convention, and ultimately therefore 
upon the importance such a state attaches to the 
private interests involved in comparison with the 
public interests of the state itself, in terms of 
external policies or general economic interests. 
On the other hand, once such a state is actually 
willing to take up such a claim, it is clear that the 
chances of having it honored might be considerably 
enlarged, in view of the practical problems of 
sueing privately in a foreign court under foreign 
law, and the political weight of the state which is 
then behind the claim. 
In conclusion, to an entity interested in undertaking 
commercial space activities, it is therefore 
important to establish to what extent it would be 
supported by especially its state of nationality, in 
case its space object is damaged by a foreign space 
object; which is the situation pertaining to damage 
of primary importance to space enterprise. 
6. The Mechanism to Deal with Liability Claims 
The aforementioned problems with the potential 
differentiation of actual victim and legal claimant 
already points forward to the fifth point of interest, 
the actual mechanism chosen by space law for 
dealing with liability claims. It is a very 
appropriate solution for a public liability document 
such as the Liability Convention, but thereby 
suffers from similar disadvantages from the point of 
view of private commercial entities while enjoying 
similar advantages. 
Under space law, while reiterating the basic public 
international duty to first undertake diplomatic 
negotiations in order to arrive at a settlement of the 
claim,34 the parties can, if these diplomatic 
negotiations do not achieve a succesful conclusion, 
establish a Claims Commission as a special 
mechanism to solve the issue,35 
How this mechanism works, has been elaborated 
upon several times,36 but since it has never been 
actually been set into operation - the only 
international claim for damage, in the case of the 
famous Cosmos-954, was solved without explicit 
reference even to the Liability Convention as a 
whole37 - the advantages and disadvantages of this 
system for private persons and commercial entities 
so far remain theory. It would most probably be a 
long process, drawn out over many years38, which 
thereby places a heavy burden on any commercial 
undertaking involved. 
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7. The Relationship between the Entity Liable for 
the Damage and the Entity Entitled to Claim the 
Compensation 
As the sixth aspect one should now have a closer 
look at a very important dichotomy with respect to 
liability, relating to the legal situation in which the 
damage takes place. This specifically concerns the 
relationship between the causa tor of the damage, or 
rather the entity held liable for it, and the victim of 
the damage, or rather the entity allowed to claim 
compensation for it. 
This relationship can be of two kinds. Either it is 
explicit and already in existence at the time the 
relevant accident leading to damage occurs, whence 
that relationship is only given additional weight by 
the fact that damage has occurred within its 
framework. Or it is implicit and solely based 
precisely on the fact that one party is the causator 
of the damage sustained by the other party. In law, 
the latter relation is translated into that of the liable 
entity with the entity entitled to claim 
compensation, obviously a legal relationship which 
in space law does not cover the factual relation to 
the extent the entities involved as causator or 
victim are not states themselves. 
As it had orginally been developed within 
municipal legal systems, in the first type of cases 
the damage occurs in the course of an activity 
usually either explicitly or implicitly undertaken 
under a contract or agreement between the causator 
and the victim. This contract liability in a 
principled sense COIncides with the inter party 
liability which presently is at issue in various 
United States court cases between participants in 
space activities, some of which are private.39 
From a legal point of view, in general dealing with 
inter party liability is a matter of the freedom of 
parties to contract between themselves. Whether 
fault or strict liability is decided upon to apply 
between parties, whether an inter party waiver of 
liability is included in the contract40 or rather a 
very uneven division of liability41, both national 
legal systems and certainly international law do not 
infringe upon this freedom to contract, other than 
provide some framework conditions for the purpose 
of protection of the general interests of society and 
the public at large. International space law also 
does not oblige states to take any action in that 
respect. Even states are therefore inter se free to 
conclude any inter party liability arrangements in 
their commercial agreements on space activities.42 
Interestingly enough, in some of the court cases 
mentioned before, the fundamental dispute was 
about the extent and the applicability of the 
freedom to contract, as much as about the 
evaluation and contents thereof.43 It was questioned 
whether certain actual events between the parties to 
the relevant contracts related to space activities, 
were covered by the terms of that contract, or 
whether they essentially took place outside of that 
contract. In the latter case, conceptually speaking it 
would almost amount to a case of third party 
liability, with one of the partners in the space 
activity concerned somehow in the role of the 
innocent and unknowing victim (namely by tort) of 
damage which was on the other hand somehow 
related to these space activities. 
Of course, we have arrived here at the general issue 
of third party liability, presenting the second type 
of liability, where the damage conceptually 
speaking is caused to an innocent and unknowing 
bystander. Protecting his interests clearly is a 
public matter, to be taken care of preferably by 
legislative means, since by definition such 
bystanders could not protect their interests 
themselves by contract or otherwise. Usually, this 
sort of liability in municipal systems is equated to 
tort liability.44 
Hence, this is also the type of liability which a 
public legislative document such as the Liability 
Convention basically deals with, as one can discern 
from the way the Convention is structured. Damage 
on the earth or to aircraft in flight is covered by the 
Convention to the extent a space object of another 
state is the cause thereof45 , and similarly as to 
damage occurring in space itself, only damage of 
one space object caused by another falls within the 
scope of the Convention46. 
An interesting point in this regard is that the 
Liability Convention to some extent, despite the 
foregoing evaluation, does make a distinction 
related to the dichotomy between inter party and 
third party liability. By distinguishing between 
damage caused on the earth or to aircaft in flight 
and damage caused to another space object, and 
providing for a much stricter regime in regard of the 
former when compared with the latter4 7, the 
Convention explicitly makes a distinction between 
truly innocent victims who could never have 
known the risks they were running and hence could 
never have taken factual or legal action to protect 
themselves against such risks, and entities which, 
although innocent parties strictly from the point of 
view of the accident causing the damage, at least 
undertook space activities while they were generally 
aware of the risks such activities entailed. 
It is on third party liability also, that the Liability 
Convention at least strongly presumes a national 
'filling in' of international liability rules for private 
entities, wherever relevant. Thus, indeed, the United 
States48, Sweden49, the United Kingdom50 and 
France51 have each in their own way done just 
that. 
For (private) commercial enterprise however, it has 
already become apparent that third party liability is 
a rather theoretical issue so far. It is on inter party 
liability questions, that companies' interests have 
already several times been at stake. It is on those 
aspects that a number of disputes have already 
reached courts or arbitral tribunals, notably in the 
United States.52 It is also for those reasons, that 
the national regulations in existence have, so to 
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speak on their own accord instead of as a direct 
consequence of international obligations arising 
under the Liability Convention, also taken some 
measures in respect of inter party liability -
especially the United States.53 
8. The Character of Liability 
This brings us logically to the seventh aspect of 
liability, the character of liability. On third party 
liability, the essential dichotomy is that between 
fault liability and absolute liability. The Liability 
Convention makes this differentiation very clearly, 
providing for absolute liability in case of damage 
sustained on the earth or by aircraft in flight, and 
for fault liability in case of damage inflicted upon 
another space object, its component parts or people 
present on board.54 
Generally speaking, more terms have been coined 
with respect to the potential character of liability 
than just the two mentioned in the Liability 
Convention, such as strict liability or risk liability. 
Nevertheless, the first essential distinction to be 
made is between a kind of liability for damage 
which applies irrespective of fault, and a kind of 
liability for damage which applies only if fault 
could be proven. 
A subsequent issue arises as to whose fault should 
be proven, that of the liable state or that of the 
actual causa tor of the damage in case the latter is a 
private entity. To the extent fault does determine 
liability in space law, the logical conclusion should 
be that it is the fault of the causator which counts; 
once that is established, the state liable as a 
launching state can not disculpate itself by arguing 
lack of fault on its own part - or, in other words, 
by claiming to have taken due diligence.55 It is a 
launching state, and hence it will have to pay. It 
could be added, that with responsibility it works the 
same way: once one is an appropriate state, one is 
responsible. 56 
Only then, further distinctions come into playas to 
whether absolute liability is indeed absolute, or can 
be escaped from under certain exculpatory 
circumstances, to be proven by the party invoking 
such exceptions to liability57, or as to whether 
there rather is a fault liability at issue with a 
reversed burden of prooP8 . 
On inter party liability on the other hand this 
dichotomy between absolute and fault liability in 
practice logically is not important any more. 
Usually, a third option is chosen, that of a waiver 
of liability with each party taking its own losses. 
The only realistic alternative here would be fault 
liability - which the Liability Convention provides 
with respect to intra-space damage - since otherwise 
both parties could end up paying for each other's 
damage, with the larger damage of the two getting 
the larger compensation rather than the lesser fault. 
Only when the question arises, in disputes arisi~g 
from inter party liability issues where damage is 
concerned which is sustained within a relationship 
of two or more participants to the same activities, 
whether the actual instance of damage did not rather 
present a case for third party liability, the issue of 
fault versus absolute liability again raises its head. 
Nevertheless, since the Liability Convention does 
not deal with these matters, it remains a matter of 
national tort (and/or contract) law to decided 
thereupon. 
9. The Compensation Itself 
The ultimaltely interesting issue for especially 
private entities undertaking space activities for 
commercial purposes of course is the eighth aspect 
of liability: the actual compensation to be paid 
once the liability claim is found to be justified. For 
this is what entities should insure themselves 
against, if national or international law allows 
claims to be laid at their doorstep. This is 
especially important for space activities in view of 
the extraordinary risks they still entail, both in 
terms of chances that accidents resulting in damage 
might occur, and in terms of chances that such 
damage might be of a catastrophic magnitude. 
The most obvious point here is the question 
whether compensation is unlimited or limited, and 
in the latter case, what those limits are and how 
they are applied. In space law, the Liability 
Convention proceeds from the idea of unlimited 
compensation. Space damage in principle is to be 
compensated to the full no matter how extensive it 
is, for the compensation "shall be determined in 
accordance with ( ... ) justice and equity, in order to 
provide such reparation in respect of the damage as 
will restore the [entity suffering the damage] ( ... ) to 
the condition which would have existed if the 
damage had not occurred"S9. Only those 
considerations of justice and equity may in first 
instance mitigate the duty to pay compensation 
otherwise only limited by the extent of the damage 
itself. 
In second instance, another relation between the 
character of liability and the question of limitations 
becomes apparent in the Liability Convention, 
mitigating the extent to which compensation is 
only limited by the extent of the damage. In the 
cases where fault liability is to be applied namely 
the Convention requires compensation of the 
damage only to the extent of the fault - not to the 
extent of the damage. Still, there is no absolute or 
flexible cap posed in an objective and general 
manner; only the circumstances of the case can ad 
hoc determine the ultimate compensation to be 
paid. 
Here the special circumstances in which fault 
liability is applied by the Liability Convention 
playa crucial role. Fault liability applies to damage 
occurring in outer space - which means: between 
two (or more) space objects. As already alluded to, 
this almost amounts to a case for inter party 
liability, at least conceptually, and the question 
concerning liability here could therefore be 
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rephrased as: is one party at fault, can only one 
party be accused of knowledgeable wrongful or 
reckless behaviour or even wilfull misconduct - in 
which case the damage sustained by that party goes 
uncompensated and the damage sustained by the 
other party is to be compensated to the full - or can 
both parties be accused of faulty behaviour, and if 
so, to what respective extent, since that would 
supposedly then define the extent to which one 
party's damage would be compensated by the other 
party. 
As the most important issue in the 'filling in' 
operation, all national legal regulations so far have 
taken care to bridge the gap on this issue as well -
be it in different ways and to a different extent. 
Under the original Commercial Space Launch 
Act60 , the United States made for unlimited 
derogation of any international claim; it was only 
by the 1988 Amendments that the United States 
government provided, in order to stimulate private 
launch activities, a sort of flexible. and not really 
unequivocal cap on liability on the national 
level61 . 
In France, by means of the Declaration a simple 
cap of FF 400 million was put on the potential 
extent to which Arianespace would have to 
reimburse the French government.62 In Sweden and 
the United Kingdom on the other hand, no cap on 
liability was imposed nationally; the system of 
unlimited compensation under the Liability 
Convention was squarely transferred from the 
international to the nationalleve1.63 
All this. of course, concerned third party liability. 
Since on inter party liability states had full 
discretion to devise their own inter party liability 
systems, the extent of national divergence is at 
least as large as it is on third party liability. In the 
United States, while other cases of inter party 
liability were considered to fall under the inter party 
waiver clauses of the Commercial Space Launch 
Act as amended in 198864• the special cases where 
the government was involved as one of the parties 
were ruled by a different system65. 
The 'partnership' between France, other ESA 
member states and Arianespace with regard to the 
latter's launchings has been dealt with differently -
as far as can be detected at this stage. The 
Declaration provided for Arianespace to have 
"financial responsibility for maintaining in good 
operational order the assets made available to it".66 
In Sweden and the United Kingdom the authorities 
have been left the discretion to decide in actual 
cases of applications for licenses upon full and 
unlimited compensation also of the government, 
while no rules on other cases of inter party liability 
were included - mainly because there was no de 
facto need.67 
10. Concluding Remarks 
By means of the above survey of eight paramount 
aspects of liability at the same time a first survey 
has been achieved of the problems arising when it 
comes to liability for commercial space activities. 
While doing so, moreover, a few special problems 
related to for instance the issue of responsibility 
have been highlighted. 
In overviewing these summary analyses, one other 
general red thread may strike the eye. While 
commercial space activities are often, implicitly or 
explicitly, equated to private space activities, from 
a practical point of view this does not hold true. 
Space activities for commercial purposes can just 
as well be undertaken by public entities, such as 
ministries or special agencies and government 
institutions, as private entities. 
Nevertheless the same regime of liability applies to 
both sorts of commercial activities; a difference 
only exists to the extent that with public entities 
the liable entity is more or less the same as the 
causator, whereas with private entities the causator 
in law is rather covered by a different entity being 
liable. The question therefore becomes what the 
importance is of the distinction in legal terms 
between public and private entities for an analysis 
of liability. This relevance is actually contained in 
the term 'level playing field', meaning a free market 
environment where all competitors (the 'players') 
operate under equal conditions. 
While liability at first sight seems to present such 
equal conditions as between private and public 
commercial undertakings, its consequences turn out 
to be different when it comes to the actual 
situations prevailing. 
The role of launching and its relation with liability 
provides the background to this red thread. For 
commercial entities, not only in a legal sense but 
also in an actual sense launching is the focal 
element of all space activities. Apart from the 
many aspects of liability directly related to launch 
activities, the fact that every true space activity 
involves space objects to be launched lends 
additional importance to the existence of the global 
launch market, whether liberalized or very regulated 
or restricted. 
Not accidentally therefore, one of the major 
problems of global commercial space activities 
dealt with at the political level is precisely that 
global launch market. Basically, at the moment 
two market- and private enterprise-oriented political 
forces, the United States and Europe, whatever its 
precise outline, are at odds with two formerly or 
presently communist, but at any rate not privately 
oriented economies, those of the Russian 
Federation (in conjunction wiLh Kazakhstan) and 
the People's Republic of China. 
The ultimate shape which the global. market will 
take, obviously will be the outcome of 
political/economical rather than legal 
considerations, if a globally level playing field is to 
be strived after. This in its turn also applies more 
generally to other space markets as such as well, be 
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it that for liability the link with the launch remains 
an umbilical cord. On the issue of liability then 
already a few aspects can be noted which so far 
obstruct the establishment of any level playing 
field, both nationally and internationally. 
Take the choice between so-called self-insurance or 
veritable insurance, for example. Maybe in practice 
those commercial entities which are public, and 
hence ultimately could lean on public treasuries as 
the deepest pockets around, alternatively on 
government's power to pressure partners in space 
activities into accepting weightier liability 
obligations, might tend to prefer to take chances, 
whereas private entities involved in commercial 
activities, if such liability applies to them, might 
rather choose insurance - as long as commercially 
reasonable in terms of premiums - than bet the 
company. 
As soon as public and private entities turn out to 
compete in the same commercial market, 
distortions may arise due to such inherent (quasi-
)financial advantages in relation to the actual 
consequences of liability of the public entities 
among the competitors. This, both with regard to 
preliminary arrangements (self-insurance against 
third party liability does not require payment of 
premiums!) and regarding the situation when it 
comes to the actual payment of damages. 
Mirrorwise, the distinction between public and 
private entities on the point of state support in case 
of damage sustained by foreign space activities may 
also play a certain role with respect to the level 
playing field in a certain market. It is an undoubted 
advantage for a public entity, if and when it can 
more easily draw upon government support to 
assert its claims than a private entity - or even, if 
the claims themselves fail, draw upon direct 
financial government support as a substitute. Thus, 
also in respect of the actual operation of the 
mechanism dealing with liability claims under the 
Liability Convention, public entities involved in 
commercial activities may enjoy similar advantages 
of state support in utilizing the possibilities of 
diplomatic negotiations or Claims Commission. 
That states are left free to conclude inter se-
arrangements on inter party liability, speaking from 
a purely commercial point of view, might also 
threaten the level playing field for at least launch 
activities, globally speaking. After all, the freedom 
to contract for private parties still depends upon the 
parameters provided thereto by whatever national 
legal system they happen to belong to. 
Where to a certain extent the important question for 
(private) commercial entities with respect to 
regulating liability is more one of regulating inter 
party liability, it might be that a global level 
playing field calls for internationally harmonized 
standards of iIiler party liability along the lines of 
the Warsaw Convention and the related treaties -
especially since in the relevant fields relatively 
speaking still so many public entities are involved. 
Once more, the question ultimately arises therefore 
as to the desirability of a global level playing field 
for launch activities, and hence indirectly for all 
space activities, and the importance therefore of 
harmonized inter party liability arrangements on the 
national level, as much as third party liability 
arrangements. Providing an answer to that question, 
however, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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